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I. INTRODUCTION
On the surface, technological advancements giving mothers-to-be the choice to
have a C-section or schedule an induction without a medical reason2 and the
continued legalization of Direct-Entry Midwifery appear to indicate that mothers are
enjoying a greater amount of choice in selecting their method of childbirth. But a
closer examination reveals that, despite “the social and cultural movement directed
toward affording pregnant, laboring, and birthing women greater autonomy and
control during this vital reproductive process,”3 limits on maternal autonomy still
exist.4 As more women deliver their children using Direct-Entry Midwives, through
elective C-sections, or through scheduled induction, these limits have the potential to
grow more intense.
This perverse effect is the result of a flawed system,5 and changes can be made to
protect maternal autonomy from the consequences of these flaws.6 Part II provides
an overview of “new” delivery options available to pregnant women today. Part III
examines how courts, legislators, health care providers, birth advocates, and insurers

2
This note will refer to C-sections requested and performed without a medical reason as
“elective C-sections,” and induced labor scheduled without a medical reason as “scheduled
induction.”
3

Suzanne K. Ketler, The Rebirth of Informed Consent: A Cultural Analysis of the
Informed Consent Doctrine After Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co Wisc., 95 NW. L. REV. 1029,
1029 (2001).
4

For a review of these limitations and some contemporary criticism of American
maternity care, see generally JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED : THE PAINFUL TRUTH ABOUT
CHILDBIRTH AND MODERN MATERNITY CARE 1-24 (Da Capo Press 2007); MARSDEN WAGNER,
BORN IN THE U.S.A: HOW A BROKEN MATERNITY SYSTEM MUST BE FIXED TO PUT WOMEN AND
CHILDREN FIRST 102 (University of California Press 2006).
5
See WAGNER, supra note 4, at 4 (arguing that the fundamental flaw in American
maternity care is that highly trained obstetricians are regularly attending normal and low risk
pregnancies); BLOCK supra note 4 (highlighting several flaws in modern maternity care).
6

This note builds on the suggestions and recommendations of many commentators. See
WAGNER, supra note 4, 205-09 (advocating for increased accountability and transparency
throughout pregnancy); Sylvia A. Law, Childbirth: An Opportunity for Choice That Should Be
Supported, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. & SOC. CHANGE 345, 362 (2008) (arguing that, where
professional opinion is in conflict and women bring different birth values to the birth
experience, the voices of women should be given greater weight); Ketler, supra note 4, at
1055-56 (discussing informed consent); Margaret M. Donohoe, Our Epidemic of Unnecessary
Cesarean Sections: The Role of the Law in Creating It, the Role of the Law in Stopping It, 11
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 197, 201-02, 238-40 (1996) (documenting the rise of unnecessary Csections and arguing that government agencies should provide women with accurate,
physician-specific information on hospital and individual physician’s C-section usage).
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limit a mother’s ability to choose what she believes to be the best delivery option.
Part IV argues that as more women begin to have home births,7 elective C-sections,
and scheduled inductions, the limits on maternal choice will grow more intense. Part
V suggests changes to combat these pressures and to protect a mother’s
independence during labor. This portion achieves its goal by offering a three-tiered
approach to empower women to make well-informed delivery choices. This threetiered approach includes: (1) empowering the mother as a decision maker by
providing her with more information and creating a system of disinterested health
care provider education; (2) offering economic incentives to freestanding alternative
birth centers and physicians, to make alternative services more appealing; and (3)
reforming informed consent to facilitate greater dialogue between physician and
patient.
II. “NEW” BIRTH OPTIONS
In the past, legal restrictions, financial considerations, or circumstances
surrounding maternal or fetal health have limited the delivery choices a mother could
exercise.8 In recent years, however, progressive legislative efforts and changing
medical standards have given American mothers a growing number of options when
deciding how they will give birth. While the number of women opting to exercise
some of these options is small,9 it is possible that these methods will grow more
popular.10 The following portion discusses several of these options.
A. Midwifery & Home Births
1. Midwifery—An Overview
Midwifery is becoming an increasingly acceptable delivery option for American
mothers.11 Throughout much of the industrialized world, the practice is recognized

7

For a discussion of home births, see infra Part II.

8

See infra Part III.

9
Nearly 100 percent of all births in the United States in 2000 took place in a hospital.
Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2000, 50 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. Feb. 2002, at
14, 71. It is not certain how many mothers are actually opting to undergo an elective C-section
without a medical reason. Law, supra note 6, at 353-54.
10
11

See infra notes 11, 34, & 76 and accompanying text.

As of July 10, 2007, twenty five states allow Direct-Entry Midwives to practice after
obtaining some licensure or certification, ten states and the District of Columbia prohibit the
practice, four states do not prohibit or regulate them, in two states the practice is legal but
licensure is unavailable, and nine states allow the practice by judicial or statutory
interpretation. Midwives Alliance of North America, Direct-Entry Midwifery State-By-State
Legal Status, www.mana.org/statechart.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2009); see also Christopher
Rausch, The Midwives and the Forceps: The Wild Terrain of Midwifery Law in the United
States and Where North Dakota is Heading in the Birthing Debate, 84 N. DAK. L. REV. 219,
230-31 (2008); Bruce Hoffman, Minding the Gap: Legal Ideals and Strategic Action in State
Legislative Hearings, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89, 94-99 (2008). Dr. Marsden Wagner Reports
that in the past ten years, Midwife attended births have increased from five to nine percent.
WAGNER, supra note 4 at 10.
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as an essential part of effective maternity care.12 In most industrialized nations,
midwives attend low-risk births, while trained obstetricians only attend dangerous
deliveries, where their advanced knowledge and skill can be put to use. 13 Such a
system does not exist in America today.14 The vast majority of deliveries in America
today occur in hospitals under the supervision of trained obstetricians.15
Midwives and physicians differ in their philosophical approach to pregnancy.16
Unlike physicians, who typically have a “disease oriented approach” to treatment,
midwives typically apply a “wellness approach.”17 The “disease-oriented approach”
focuses on the diagnosis and treatment of pregnancy complications and the
“management of diseases affecting pregnant women and the fetuses they carry.”18
When applied, this “no case is normal until it’s over” philosophy may be
contributing to the ever-increasing number of obstetrical interventions throughout
pregnancy.19 Midwives, on the other hand, apply the more holistic and hands-off
“wellness approach,” wherein a great deal of trust is placed into the body’s ability to
bring about a safe delivery and medical intervention is avoided until absolutely
necessary.20 Some have suggested that this approach is not financially attractive to
hospitals because it results in longer deliveries that lessen the number of potential
patients, and does not provide hospitals the opportunity to make a profit through
administering billable procedures.21
12
In Australia, the Netherlands, Great Britain, all Scandinavian countries, Germany,
Ireland, and other industrialized nations more than seventy-five percent of all births are
assisted by trained midwifes. WAGNER, supra note 4, at 4.
13

In most European nations, obstetricians attend between ten to fifteen percent of births.
Id. at 5.
14

Id. at 4-5.

15

Nearly 100 percent of all births in the United States in 2000 took place in a hospital.
Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final Data for 2000, 50 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. Feb. 2002, at
14, 71. Obstetricians attended nearly ninety percent of those births. WAGNER, supra note 4, at
5.
16
See generally Laura D. Hermer, Midwifery: Strategies on the Road to Universal
Legalization, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 325, 329-35 (2003) (explaining the differences in health care
provider treatment philosophies).
17

Id.

18

Id. at 329-30 (citing to JUDITH PENCE ROOKS, MIDWIFERY AND CHILDBIRTH IN AMERICA
4 (Temple University Press 1997)).
19

Id. at 331.

20

Id. at 332.

21

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 66. At the same time, because midwives are paid less than
physicians and the non-interventionist approach reduces the number of unnecessary medical
interventions, the midwife model of care has been lauded as offering a significantly less
expensive method of childbirth. WAGNER, supra note 4 at 39, 121; Rausch, supra note 11, at
229. Some have asserted that the economic threat that out-of-hospital birth presents to the
mainstream medical community is a factor contributing to restrictive midwifery laws. See
Amy F. Cohen, The Midwifery Stalemate and Childbirth Choice: Recognizing Mothers-to-Be
as the Best Late Pregnancy Decisionmakers, 80 IND. L. J. 849, 854 (2005).
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Regardless of their profit value, midwives have been providing birthing mothers
with a valuable service for centuries.22 Midwife advocates boast that the practice is
the oldest form of maternity care.23 But today’s midwives are much different from
their old-world predecessors.24 Midwifery in America has evolved into a trade
whose practitioners possess highly developed skills and training.25 As the practice
has evolved, different midwifery classifications have developed.
The two primary midwife classifications are Certified Nurse Midwives and
Direct-Entry Midwives.26 Every American jurisdiction permits Certified Nurse
Midwives to practice within its borders.27 Certified Nurse Midwives are formally
educated nurses who acquire a nursing degree and then complete further study in
Obstetrics and Gynecology before passing a certification examination.28 Typically, a
Certified Nurse Midwife will practice in an institutional setting under a physician’s
direct control.29
Unlike their formally trained counterparts, Direct-Entry Midwives often take less
traditional routes to practice. Some Direct-Entry Midwives are educated through
informal routes such as self-study or apprenticeship, rather than through a formal
program.30 While many Direct-Entry Midwives can become certified through either
the North American Registry of Midwives (NARM) or the American College of
Nurse-Midwives (ACNM),31 “not all Direct-Entry Midwives are certified.”32 Some
avoid certification because they view the training as harmful or irrelevant, while

22

Women have been aiding each other throughout birth since the early civilizations. M.
Brucker, A History of Midwifery, http://www3.utsouthwestern.edu/midwifery/mdwf
history.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2009); see also Rausch, supra note 11, at 224-25 (2008)
(reviewing the history of midwives). Females dominated the practice through the eighteenth
century, until gynecology and surgery began to be studied by academics. Id. (citing to BRIAN
E. BURTCH, TRIALS OF LABOUR: THE RE-EMERGENCE OF MIDWIFERY 80 (1994)).
23

See generally Rausch, supra note 11, at 224.

24

Id. at 224-227.

25

See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.

26

See generally Noralyn O. Harlow, Annotation, Midwifery: State Regulation, 59 A.L.R.
4th 929, 932 (1988). Direct-Entry Midwives are also referred to as “lay” midwives, for the
sake of uniformity, this Note will only use the term “Direct-Entry Midwives.”
27

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 102.

28

Harlow, supra note 26.

29

Id. (citing to Debra Evenson, Midwives: Survival of an Ancient Profession, 7 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 313, 314 (1982)).
30

See generally Harlow, supra note 26; Rausch, supra note 11, at 223.

31

NARM is an international certification agency created by the Midwives’ Alliance of
North America (“MANA”) “to create [an] internationally accepted direct-entry midwifery
credential to preserve the unique, woman-centered forms of practice that are common to
midwives attending out-of-hospital births.” North American Registry of Midwives, NARM
Mission Statement, http://www.narm.org/mission.htm (last visited Dec. 27 2008). See
generally Hermer, supra note 16, at 334 (discussing the NARM and ACNM certifications).
32

Hermer, supra note 16 at 334.
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others practice illegally in states that do not permit them to attend births. Finally,
others simply lack the education, skills, or training needed to gain certification.33
2. A More Appealing Approach?
Despite their lack of formal training, more women are utilizing Direct-Entry
Midwives.34 In applying the more holistic “wellness approach,” Direct-Entry
Midwives offer mothers in low-risk pregnancies a birthing option that removes the
mother from the hospital and gives her a great deal of freedom during labor.35
Unlike Certified Nurse Midwives, Direct-Entry Midwives typically attend home
births.36 In a home birth, a laboring woman will usually deliver from her own house
and will remain with her baby after the delivery.37 As Direct-Entry Midwifery
becomes increasingly available, the number of women choosing home births appears
to be increasing.38
The freedom offered by home births lies in stark contrast to what may be
experienced in a hospital setting. In the hospital, once labor begins, mothers are
often physically restricted to their hospital bed so that the fetal heart rate may be
tracked using Electronic Fetal Monitors (EFMs).39 Despite little evidence supporting
their efficacy, EFMs are the “presumptive standard of care”40 in the hospital.41 Two
rationales support making EFMs the standard. First, EFMs are a more cost effective
method for monitoring fetal heart rate,42 and second, they provide concrete evidence
33

Id. Many illegally practicing midwives could only learn the trade through
apprenticeships, because these midwives have been successfully delivering children without
formal education, some see no reason to reason to further their education. Id.
34

The midwife and home birth movement has grown increasingly popular in recent years.
Julie Scelfo, Midwives Say Home Births Are Up, Despite Warnings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/13/garden/13birth.html?pagewanted=
1&_r=2 (last visited Nov. 23, 2008) (documenting the increased number of women choosing
home births in New York City). Since 2007, a popular documentary and several books have
been produced claiming to expose many problems with American maternity care and
proposing that the solution for many women is to get out of the hospital and back into the
home. See, e.g., THE BUSINESS OF BEING BORN (New Line Home Video 2007); BLOCK, supra
note 4, at 268.
35

See infra notes 36-48 and accompanying text. In home births, mothers can set the
environment according to their liking and freely move about without the fear of unnecessary
medical intervention. This is in stark contrast to being constrained to a bed and hooked to
Electronic Fetal Monitors (EFMs), as is the presumptive standard of care in hospitals.
36

Hermer, supra note 16, at 334; see also Rausch, supra note 11, at 223-25.

37

Scelfo, supra note 34.

38

Id.; Cf. BLOCK, supra note 4 at 268 (documenting the emerging birthing rights
movement).
39

Law, supra note 6, at 361-62 (explaining the use of EFMs).

40

Id. at 362 (quoting H. David Banta & Stephen B. Thacker, Historical Controversy in
Health Technology Assessment: The Case of Electronic Fetal Monitoring, 56 OBSTETRICAL &
GYNECOLOGICAL SURV. 707, 714 (2001)).
41

Id.

42

Id.
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should an accident occur.43 Home births are attractive, in part because they offer
mothers the chance to deliver in the comfort of their own home, free from the
restrictive EFMs, with little or no medication, and the freedom to move as they
please.44
Freedom is not the only reason that some opt to deliver via home births.45 For
many, choosing to deliver away from the hospital is a choice that reflects spiritual,
religious, political, and feminist beliefs.46 It is important to understand how firmly
some mothers hold these beliefs.47 Trivializing this important point creates
misunderstandings between lawmakers, physicians, and patients.48
3. Concerns Surrounding Home Births
Despite the increased acceptance of home birth as a valid birth option, criticisms
about its safety persist.49 Because midwives are not infallible and serious
complications can turn low-risk pregnancies into high-risk deliveries with no
warning,50 some suggest that the option needlessly risks the health and safety of both
mother and child.51 Fetal injuries may occur because home births create distance
between mothers, skilled obstetricians, and valuable hospital equipment.52 Others
are concerned by Direct-Entry Midwives’ lack of formal education.53

44

Scelfo, supra note 34.

45

Cohen, supra note 21, at 858-62.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

See, e.g., id. at 854-62, 880 (arguing that midwifery advocates have not clearly
communicated the numerous facets of their beliefs about childbirth to other parties).
49
Whether or not these concerns are justified is unclear. The data concerning the safety
of delivering with a midwife suggests that for low-risk births, delivering with a midwife is a
safe choice. See generally BLOCK, supra note 4, at 95,264; WAGNER, supra note 4 at 35, 130;
Hermer, supra note 16, at 339-48; Rausch, supra note 11, at 227-30.
50

Joseph Heyman, Letter to Editor, L.A. TIMES July 23, 2008 available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/18830.html (last accessed Nov. 21, 2008). Dr.
Heyman is Chairman of the Board of Trustees for the American Medical Association. See also
Rausch, supra note 11, at 229-30. States have attempted to combat these dangers by requiring
that Certified Nurse Midwives & Direct- Entry Midwives have written “supervisor” or
“consultant” agreements with an obstetrician. WAGNER, supra note 4, at 132.
51

Heyman, supra note 50.

52
Cf. Ramsay v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 808 N.Y.S.2d 374 (2005) (granting defendantphysician’s motion to dismiss because physician was not present at home delivery attended by
midwife).
53
See WAGNER, supra note 4, at 118-19 (documenting that at state legislative hearings
considering legalizing Direct-Entry Midwifery, the common criticism lobbied against
midwives was that delivering outside the hospital is “not safe.”).

52
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Midwives often defend against health concerns by explaining that the option is
only available to mothers in low-risk births.54 Studies have also demonstrated that
the use of midwives is “just as safe, if not safer than medical care in low risk
childbirth.”55 But at least some empirical evidence suggests that despite only taking
on low-risk births, home births may be more dangerous than delivering in a
hospital.56 This may be because no dependable method exists to predict if or when a
low-risk pregnancy may turn dangerous.57
4. Questionable Support
Even in states where Direct-Entry Midwifery is allowed, it is not always viewed
favorably. In 2007, Missouri added its name to the growing number of states
legalizing Direct-Entry Midwifery.58 The bill legalizing the practice, House Bill
818,59 passed in large part because of creative draftsmanship, and not because of
genuine legislative support.60 House Bill 818,61 a 123 page bill dealing with health
insurance, never once mentioned midwifery.62 Instead, Senator John Loudan buried
language into the tail end of the bill permitting “any person who holds tocological
certification … [to] provide services as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-

54

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 41; Rausch, supra note 11, at 229-30; Cohen, supra note 21,
at 858-59.
55
Hermer, supra note 16, at 326; see also Rausch, supra note 11, at 227-229
(summarizing the statistical support for the safety of midwifery).
56

Mr. Rausch discusses several of these studies. See Rausch, supra note 11, at 229-30.
Mr. Rausch highlighted that one study has shown that physicians are far more successful than
midwives under certain circumstances. See id. (citing to Lewis Mehl-Madrona & Morgaine
Mehl-Madrona, Physician and Midwife-Attended Home Births: Effects of Breech, Twin and
Post-Dates Outcome Data on Mortality Rates, 42 J. NURSE MIDWIFERY 91, 95 (1997)). That
study showed that the infant mortality rate is over three times higher in home births involving
post-date, twin, or breech deliveries. Id. Others have also reached the similar conclusions. See
Amy Tuteur, New Wisconsin Statistics Continue to Show High Homebirth Death Rate,
www.homebirthdebate.blogspot.com (citing to http://dhs.wisconsin.gov/wish/measures/inf_
mort/long_form.html) (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). Dr. Tuteur examined statistics compiled by
the state of Wisconsin and concluded that they suggest that the neonatal death rate for home
births attended by lay midwives are nearly three times higher than those low risk births
performed in hospitals.
57

Rausch, supra note 11, at 229. See also Scelfo, supra note 34 (quoting Dr. Erin Tracey).

58

MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1753 (LexisNexis 2008).

59

H.B. 818, 94th Gen. Assem., First Reg, Sess, (Mo. 2007).

60
The Missouri legislature had expressly refused to create a licensing board for DirectEntry midwives earlier in the 2007 legislative session. See S. 303, 94th Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2007). See also Matthew Franck, Midwives Bill Slips Through Missouri
Legislature, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
May 15, 2007, at A1, available at
http://www.stltoday.com/stltoday/news/special/srlinks.nsf/story/F661D676A70DF7CF862572
DC007A159E?OpenDocument. (last visited Dec. 2, 2008).
61

Mo. H.B.818.

62

Id.
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6(b)(4)(E)(ii)(I).”63 The addition went unnoticed until shortly after the Missouri
Congress passed the bill, at which point senators unsuccessfully attempted to nix the
legislation before it was signed into effect.64 Following its enactment, Senator
Loudan was briefly removed from his position as Chair of the Senate Small Business
Committee65 and a lawsuit brought by several physicians’ associations was heard
before the Missouri Supreme Court.66
The frenzy surrounding Direct-Entry Midwives polarized many within
Missouri.67 And while Direct-Entry Midwifery is now a legal practice,68 the battle
fought over its legalization has contributed to the sometimes hostile relationship
between doctors and midwives.69 As midwifery grows more popular, such
relationships could diminish the quality of healthcare available to mothers.
B. Elective C-Sections
Physicians have been performing C-sections in emergencies for some time.70
While the procedure is major surgery,71 C-sections have become safe72 enough that
63

Id. Sen. Loudan made certain that the meaning of this provision would not be easily
determinable on first glance. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-6(b)(4)(E)(ii)(I) (2008) permits for an
additional six month extension of emergency medical assistance for services related to
pregnancy. And “tocological certification” is a derivative of the Greek term “tokos,” meaning
childbirth. Franck, supra note 60. “Tocology” is defined as the science of obstetrics and
midwifery. Id.
64

Franck, supra note 60.

65

Id.

66

Mo. State Med. Ass’n v. State, 256 S.W. 3d 85 (Mo. 2007) (reversing trial court
judgment finding the statute constitutionally invalid because the plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring suit).
67

Franck, supra note 60.

68

See, e.g., Mo. State Med Ass’n, 526 S.W.3d at 86.

69

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 115.

70

Elena Conis, Cesarean Section’s Ancient History, LA Times, May 1 2006 at F-3,
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/may/01/health/he-esoterica1 (last visited Feb 12,
2009). Early Chinese drawings depict newborns being removed from openings in their
mother’s abdomen and ancient Roman law required babies to be surgically removed when the
mother died before or during labor. Id. The procedure was generally performed only where
the mother had little chance for survival or was already dead until the late middle ages. Id.
Women began surviving the procedure with some regularity in the 18th century. Id. It has
since become a common procedure throughout the civilized world. Id. Since the 1970’s,
America’s high C-section rate has been the subject of much criticism. See generally BLOCK,
supra note 4, at 109-13; Law, supra note 6 at 345-46. In 2007 America’s C-section rate rose
for the eleventh consecutive year, reaching an all time high of thirty-one and eight tenths
percent. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Nat'l Vital Stats. Reports, Births:
Preliminary Data for 2007, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr57/
nvsr57_12.pdf (last visited Aug. 25, 2009). International studies show that when the C-section
rate is between ten and fifteen percent, the maternal mortality rate decreases. WAGNER, supra
note 4, at 42, 47-48 (citing to and explaining the methodology leading to the World Health
Organization’s conclusion and consistent recommendations that a ten to fifteen percent Csection rate is the optimal rate for maternal and fetal health).
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physicians may give mothers the option to request that their child be delivered using
this method without a medical reason.73 There is a professional consensus that, at a
woman's request, it is medically acceptable and sometimes ethically responsible to
perform C-sections without a medical reason.74 Although the number of women
requesting elective C-sections is small,75 it is possible that more women will opt to
deliver in this fashion.76

71

A physician performs a cesarean delivery by making an incision in the abdominal wall
and uterus (rather than through the vagina) the amniotic fluid is suctioned out and then the
baby is delivered. American Pregnancy Association, Cesarean Procedure,
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/labornbirth/cesareanprocedure.html (last visited Nov. 21,
2008). The normal cesarean procedure will take an average of forty-five minutes to an hour.
The baby is usually delivered in the first five to fifteen minutes and the remainder of time is
used for closing the incision. Id. This is much quicker than the typical vaginal delivery.
WAGNER, supra note 4, at 38-44.
72

The dangers presented by C-sections are well documented. See WAGNER, supra note 4
at 44-45. Dr. Wagner posits that women who choose C-sections do not appreciate the risk they
are taking. Id. Despite the risks, Professor Law argues that elective C-sections are a justifiable
choice for women to make. Law, supra note 6 at 346.
73

This position has garnered more acceptance in the past decade. In 2003, The American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (“ACOG”) stated that it was sometimes medically
and ethically responsible for a physician to perform a C-section without a medical reason, and
in 2006, the National Institute of Health (“NIH”) recognized that in some circumstances that
elective C-section might be a reasonable alternative to planned vaginal delivery. See generally
BLOCK, supra note 4 at 56; Law, supra note 6, at 347, 353. Professor Law offers a thorough
discussion of the motives and rationales of those who choose to exercise this option. See id. at
347-54 (discussing the motivations and effects underlying the choice to undergo an elective Csection).
74
Law, supra note 6 at 353. Professor Law supports this position by explaining that the
ACOG, the New England Journal of Medicine, and the National Institutes of Health have each
reached this conclusion. Id. (citing to American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,
Surgery and Patient Choice, Op. No. 289 11 (2003); Howard Minkoff & Frank Chervenak,
Elective Primary Cesarean Delivery, 348 NEW ENG. J. Med. 946 (2003); Nat’l Insts. of
Health, State-of-the-Science Conference Statement, Cesarean Delivery on Maternal Request,
March 27-29, at 14). Professor Law further notes that surveys show that practicing physicians
have a wide range of attitudes towards performing C-sections without a medical reason. Id. at
353.
75
See Law, supra note 6, at 353 (citing to Childbirth Connection’s “Listening to Mothers”
survey documenting that only one out of one thousand three hundred women reported
requesting a C-section).
76
Evidence suggests that the number of women opting to have a C-section without a
medical reason may be increasing. See BLOCK, supra note 4 at 52 (documenting that, in at
least one hospital, physicians reported that one out of every approximately sixty women are
making unprompted requests for elective C-sections); see, e.g., Barbara Bettes, et al, Cesarean
Delivery on Maternal Request, 109 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 57, 58, 61 (2007) (internal
citations omitted) (documenting that more than half of American physicians have either
performed a C-section on maternal request or would be willing to do so and in 2006 58% of
obstetricians observed an increase in inquiries regarding elective C-section).
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C. Induced Labor
American women may also elect to have their labor induced through physicianadministered drugs prior to the child initiating the labor process.77 Labor is induced
using intravenous medication, usually Oxytocin78(or its synthetic form, Pitocin79),
that brings on contractions in the uterus.80 Other methods for inducing labor include
rupturing the amniotic sac (breaking the water) or dilating the cervix.81 Today,
approximately fifteen percent of babies born in America are delivered via induced
labor.82 Although this practice is nothing new, the frequency with which physicians
rely upon these medications is often criticized, and is an impetus behind the reaction
against “medicalized” birth that is causing some mothers to deliver outside the
hospital.83
III. LIMITING MATERNAL AUTONOMY
To understand why exercising these options with greater frequency will lead to
diminished maternal choice, it is first important to examine several problems with
maternity care in America. A flaw in this “broken”84 system is the multitude of ways
77

American Pregnancy Association, Inducing Labor, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/
labornbirth/inducinglabor.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008); see also American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Labor Induction, http://www.acog.org/publications/patient_
education/bp154.cfm (last visited October 19, 2008).
78

Oxytocin is a hormone produced by the hypothalamus that is stored in and released from
the pituitary gland. 1 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1 (citing to STEPHEN GABBE ET AL.,
OBSTETRICS: NORMAL AND PROBLEM PREGNANCIES 363 (1986)).
79

1 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1.

80

1 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1.

81

American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 77.

82

Id.

83

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 78, 85, 130, 190; BLOCK, supra note 4, at 14, 41, 268; Cohen,
supra note 21, at 858. This Note posits that the reaction against medicalized birth will
contribute to more combative delivery behavior that may have adverse consequences in some
situations.
84
WAGNER, supra note 4, at 1-12. Wagner and others are calling America’s maternity care
system “broken” for numerous reasons. Commentators cite to the over-medicalization of
maternity care as a primary problem, as well as the illegality of Direct-Entry Midwifery and
the difficulty many mothers experience when they wish to attempt to deliver vaginally after a
C-section (VBAC). BLOCK, supra note 4, at 17-31, 77 (discussing the “active management of
labor” and VBAC); WAGNER, supra note 4, at 39-40 (explaining that physicians are trained to
find problems in dangerous situations and suggesting that the result is that too many women
are receiving unnecessary treatment); Cohen, supra note 21, at 850 (documenting that many
women believe midwifery to be a viable, but unavailable option); Donohoe, supra note 6 at
241 (explaining that the root of the unnecessary C-section problem is the physicians “need to
‘do’”). The recent trend towards home births is, in part, a reaction against the overmedicalization of birth pervading American maternity care today. See supra note 83.
Statistics concerning maternal and fetal mortality rates are often cited to bolster these
criticisms. As of 2005, twenty-eight countries have lower maternal mortality rates and fortyone nations have lower infant mortality rates than the United States. World Health
Organization, http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/publications/maternal_mortality_2005/
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that maternal choice is limited by the government, health care providers, advocacy
groups, and insurance companies.85 The following portion will examine several
factors contributing to this broken system.
A. Legal Basis for Maternal Choice
Before discussing how maternal autonomy is being limited, it is first important to
review what rights the law proscribes to pregnant women when determining how
they will deliver their child. This section will discuss how physicians may coerce
patients into undergoing certain medical procedures in an effort to protect fetal
health. Generally, such coercion may infringe upon a woman’s right to refuse
medical treatment or to be free from unwanted medical intrusion.86
This section will also discuss how the government has implemented laws
restricting midwifery and freestanding alternative birth centers.
Several
commentators have suggested that a mother’s right to choose alternative modes of
childbirth is constitutionally protected.87 Although the Supreme Court has not yet
found that such a right exists, Amy F. Cohen identifies several arguments to support
the contention that a mother’s right to make alternative birth choices, like home birth
with a Direct-Entry Midwife, is a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.88 First, because personal autonomy is at the root of the privacy right,89
and childbirth decisions are intensely personal decisions90 that present “social,
economic, and political, rather than merely medical issues,”91 the maternal right to
choose different birth methods is strongly supported by the right to privacy.92

mme_2005.pdf (last accessed Dec. 1 2008); Central Intelligence Agency, The World
Factbook, Infant Mortality Rate, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/fields/2091.html (last accessed Dec. 1 2008).
85

See, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 4 at 261.

86

See generally Pamala Harris, Compelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: The
Balancing of Maternal and Fetal Rights, 49 CLEV. ST. L. R. 133, 139-40 (2001) (“A competent
pregnant woman may, for many reasons, refuse medical treatment that a physician regards as
beneficial to the woman, the fetus, or in some instances, both.”).
87

In advocating for a woman’s right to select midwifery, Amy Cohen condensed these
arguments into one place. See Cohen, supra note 21; see also Charles Wolfson, Midwives and
Home Birth: Social, Medical and Legal Perspectives, 37 Hastings L.J. 909, 935 (1986); Harry
M. Caldwell, Bowland v. Municipal Court Revisited: A Defense Perspective on Unlicensed
Midwife Practice in California, 15 PAC L.J. 19, 29-30 (1983); Dale Elizabeth Walker,
Comment, A Matter of Quality of Births: Mothers and Midwives Shackled by the Medical
Establishment and Pennsylvania Law, 23 DUQ. L. REV. 171, 192-94 (1984); Barbara A.
McCormick, Childbearing and Nurse-Midwives: A Woman’s Right to Choose, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 661; 682-97 (1983).
88

Cohen, supra note 21, at 869-875.

89

Id. at 870.

90

McCormick, supra note 87, at 686 (explaining further that denial of the right would
impose psychological, physical, social, and financial burdens upon the woman).
91

Wolfson, supra note 87, at 941-42.

92

Cohen, supra note 21, at 869.
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Second, the possibility of surgical invasion implicates the right to bodily integrity.93
Because bodily integrity is “the mainstay of any … privacy argument,” Ms. Cohen
suggests this further supports maternal choice being a fundamental right.94 Finally, a
woman’s parental authority to make decisions for the upbringing of her family also
supports the conclusion that a woman has a fundamental right to choose alternative
delivery methods.95
As compelling as these arguments may be, whether the Court would recognize
that such a right exists is not clear. The Court's reluctance to recognize "new"
fundamental rights may make establishing such a right unlikely.96 Ms. Cohen
viewed the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, with its affirmation of
the “expansive language on substantive due process, liberty, and the sweet mystery
of life”97 quoted in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, as a harbinger that the Court may
expand substantive due process to recognize the right to make alternative birth
decisions (midwifery) as a fundamental right.98
Since Ms. Cohen’s article, Gonzales v. Carhart has further illuminated the
Court’s view on substantive due process.99 Carhart is “the most definitive statement
to date from the Roberts Court of its approach to substantive due process
methodology.”100 Northwestern University’s Professor Steven Calabresi reads
Carhart as marking “a pointed retreat from Lawrence.”101 Professor Calabresi
argues that Carhart demonstrates that “[Justice Kennedy] and four other Justices
have recommitted themselves to the narrow, restrained approach of Glucksberg in
substantive due process cases."102 This affirmation of a “cautious, pro-judicial
restraint approach suggests a greatly reduced role for the Court in inventing new
constitutional rights that is dramatically opposed to the expansive language of Casey
and Lawrence.”103 Consequently, it may be unlikely that the Court will find that
such a right does exist.
Whether or not the Court will conclude that the right to make alternative
childbirth decisions is fundamental is a valuable consideration. Should the Court
93

McCormack, supra note 87, at 691.

94

Id.

95

Cohen supra note 21, at 872.

96

Id.

97

Stephen Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 1517 (2008).
98

Cohen, supra note 21.

99

550 U.S. 124 (2007).

100

Calbresi, supra note 97, at 1520.

101

David D. Meyer, Gonzales v. Carhart and the Hazards of Muddled Scrutiny, 17 J. L.
POL’Y 57, 60 (2008).
102

Calabresi, supra note 97, at 1517. In so reaching this conclusion, Professor Calabresi
also points out that the Court never once cites Lawrence or the expansive language on
substantive due process, liberty, and the sweet mystery of life that the Lawrence opinion
quoted from Casey. Id.
103

Id. at 1520.

58

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 23:45

revert to the broad Casey conception of fundamental rights, as it did in Lawrence,
then some of the restrictions discussed below may be in violation of this right.
Moreover, recognizing that such a right exists could reduce physician paternalism
that has been identified as causing unnecessary C-sections104 and pushing some
women to deliver outside the hospital setting.105
B. Other Legal Interests Affecting Maternal Choice
To comprehend fully why maternal choice is limited, it is necessary to examine
briefly the legal interests that the government and health care providers have in a
mother’s delivery decision. Physicians owe a duty of care to both the mother and her
fetus,106 and the state has a compelling interest in fetal health.107 Sometimes, a
mother’s refusal to receive medical treatment conflicts with these interests.108 When
a physician believes the mother’s birth decision places fetal health at risk, doctors are
faced with an ethical dilemma.109 The physician can either honor the woman’s
refusal or “compel her to treatment by seeking a court order.”110 The consensus
among medical professionals is that such actions are almost never appropriate.111
And while courts have held that the decision of whether or not to undergo medical
treatment is one that must be honored, others have determined that the mother’s right
to refuse medical treatment is not absolute, and must be balanced against the state or
fetal interests.112 In some unusual circumstances, courts have compelled women to
submit to medical intervention.113 Although interventions are rare, this Note posits

104

Donohoe, supra note 6, at 235-36 (suggesting that doctors interpret the legal treatment
of maternal and fetal rights as being in competition with one another, and, as a consequence
receive a message that paternalism towards their patients is acceptable). If a mother’s right to
make childbirth choices is given greater recognition, physician paternalism would conceivably
be diminished, as physicians would receive a message that the mother’s right to choose is
afforded greater legal significance that should not be subordinated to protect the fetus.
105

Cohen, supra note 21, at 858.

106

See Harris, supra note 86, at 140-43.

107

Id.

108

Id. See infra notes 151-176 and accompanying text.

109

Harris, supra note 86, at 140-43.

110

Id. at 134.

111

See Linda C. Fentiman, The New “Fetal Protection”: The Wrong Answer to the Crisis
of Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 537, 569-70 (2006)
(noting that the American Medical Association, the American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecology, and the American Academy of Pediatrics each have adopted strong positions
against compelled medical treatment).
112

See John Alan Cohan, Judicial Enforcement of Lifesaving Treatment for Unwilling
Patients, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 849, 896-911 (2006) (documenting cases involving pregnant
women refusing medical treatment).
113
See generally Jefferson v. Griffin Spaulding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga.
1981); Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., 66 F. Supp.2d 1247 (N.D. Fla.
1999). See also April Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant
Women for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147 (2007) (discussing the
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that as home births, and more generally the reaction against medicalized birth of
which they are an outgrowth, become more popular, more women will refuse to
consent to procedures during hospital deliveries. As more mothers do not consent to
what physicians believe to be the appropriate delivery method, the delivery room
will become a hostile environment. When conflicts arise in such a hostile
environment, courts may be called upon to force mothers to submit to medical
treatment. In light of the chaotic circumstances surrounding such deliveries,114 and
the government’s propensity to protect the fetus from harm,115 this Note posits that
an increase in court-compelled medical treatment may result.
C. Governmental Limitations
1. Generally
As pregnancy progresses, the number of government limitations on a mother’s
birth options increase. Every state has the power to regulate the midwives who
practice within its borders.116 Depending upon the state, the government may also
restrict choice by limiting where a woman may choose to deliver her child, or by
failing to require that certain information be made available for mothers to make
birth decisions. The following portion discusses these restrictions before shifting its
focus to explore ways that the government limits maternal autonomy to protect fetal
health.
2. Birth Centers
Birth centers offer women a delivery choice other than hospitals or the home.
Generally, these centers can either be “freestanding” or run in conjunction with a
hospital.117 Freestanding alternative birth centers are establishments run by
midwives with permanent facilities that operate independent of any hospital
affiliation,118 and provide prenatal care only to low-risk child bearing women.119
Freestanding alternative birth centers are not available everywhere.120 Presently state
judiciary’s use of incarceration, detention, and threats to compel pregnant women to submit to
physician decisions regarding medical treatment for the benefit of fetal health); Fentiman,
supra note 111, at 569 (documenting a 2004 court ordered C-section that was never carried
out because the mother, after refusing to consent to a C-section, successfully delivered
vaginally at another hospital).
114

“[P]roceedings in court-ordered cesareans are usually procedurally inadequate,” Cohen,
supra note 21, at 866-67 n.75.
115

See infra Part III.C.4

116

See generally Hermer, supra note 16 (discussing midwifery law in America); Stacy A.
Tovino, American Midwifery Litigation and State Legislative Preferences for Physician
Controlled Childbirth, 11 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 68-69 (2004) (discussing current legal
status of midwifery in America).
117

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 137.

118

Id. at 133; See also 902 KY. ADMIN. R. 20:150 (2008).

119

902 KY. ADMIN. R. 20:150 (2008).

120

See, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 4 at 106, 267.
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regulations specifically governing how birth centers can operate may limit birth
center location121 or the number of centers permissible in one geographic region.122
Despite these restrictions, as of 2006, 160 freestanding alternative birth centers
existed in the United States.123 But a number of these centers are struggling to stay
open, in part because compliance with additional statutory requirements124 and high
insurance premiums make operating for profit difficult.125
To accommodate maternal demand for a less sterile and more homely
atmosphere, some hospitals have also begun to offer their own birth centers.126
Unfortunately, these options are subject to many of the same criticisms as
hospitals.127 Hospitals have also tried to accommodate for these demands by offering
home-like birth suites.128 Even if a mother wishes to deliver in a birth suite, she may
not be able to do so because delivering in one can be costly129 and reserving a suite
does not guarantee that delivery will take place within.130

121
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1204.3 (Deering 2009) (requiring alternative birth
centers to be located within 30 minutes in both time and distance from a facility with the
capacity to manage obstetrical and neonatal emergencies).
122

210 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3/30(a-25) (2009) (requiring that “[t]here shall be no more than
10 birth center alternative care models . . . .”). That section further limits the number of birth
centers located throughout the state according to population. Id.
123

WAGNER, supra note 5, at 137.

124

Id. at 132 (discussing the “supervisor” and “consultant” relationships that some states
require midwives to be engaged in with a practicing physician in order to practice legally);
see, e.g. Kelly Dunleavy, Sacramento’s Alternative Birth Options Dwindle, Sacramento
Business Journal, October 5, 2007, available at http://sacramento.bizjournals.com/sacramento
/stories /2007/10/08/focus2.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2009) (documenting the closing of a
Sacramento birth center, which is required by law to have “supervising” agreements between
doctors and midwives, and noting that no area physicians were willing to work with the closed
birth center).
125
See, e.g., Dunleavy, supra note 124; Katherine Shaver, Birth Centers’ Closures Limit
Delivery Options, The WASHINGTON POST, May 18, 2007, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/17/AR2007051702301.html
(last visited Aug. 25, 2009) (documenting “rising malpractice insurance premiums and
lagging insurance premiums” as a cause of birth center closures in the Washington-Baltimore
area).
126

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 133.

127

Id. Unlike in freestanding alternative birth centers, “where the mother has the final say
about everything that happens to her,” hospital birth centers are staffed by obstetricians whose
disease oriented approach makes medication and intervention just as likely as in a normal
hospital. Id.
128
See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., Dept of Obstetrics and Gynecology, A “Suite”
Experience, www.cedars-siani.edu/1799.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
129

As of Dec. 1, 2008, a birth suite at Cedars Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles costs
from $1,869 to $2,646 per day. Id.
130

Id.
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3. Maternal Information Statutes
Commentators consistently argue that empowering women is the best way to
solve many maternity care problems.131 Despite this consensus, only two states are
attempting to give mothers the appropriate information to make their delivery
decisions by requiring that hospitals make their C-section and induction rates
available to potential patients.132 New York requires that every hospital and birth
center prepare and distribute to every prospective maternity patient, upon request, an
informational leaflet explaining the treatments available.133 Included in that
pamphlet must be the annual C-section rates performed at the facility.134 In contrast
to the more specific requirements in New York, many states simply require that
hospitals keep some records of all C-sections performed, and that these records be
submitted to an appropriate agency.135 By failing to require that specific information
be made available to mothers, governments are inhibiting a mother’s ability to make
the best possible decision for herself and her child.136
4. Protecting the Fetus
Much has been written about the continued expansion and recognition of fetal
rights by American courts and legislatures.137 Before the landmark case Roe v.

131

Donohoe, supra note 6 at 237-40; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 11, 205-208; see,, e.g.
Law, supra note 6, at 362 (arguing that mother’s opinions ought to be given greater weight in
the labor process).
132
BLOCK, supra, note 4 at 270; Donohoe, supra note 6 at 237; Transcript, What to
Expect: Legal Developments and Challenges in Reproductive Justice, 15 CARDOZO J. L.
GENDER 503, 513 (2009). It appears that states are making more information available to the
public through the internet. See http://thebirthsurvey.com/dev/Results/learn_state.shtml (last
visited Aug. 25, 2009) (compiling the information available for all 50 states and providing
links to individual state websites). A review of state websites shows that C-section and
intervention rates may be organized by county, mother’s age, race, or sometimes hospital. Id.
As helpful as this information may be, the information some hospitals may provide could be
inaccurate or outdated. WAGNER, supra note 4, at 11, 206; see, e.g., Betsy Gotbaum, A
Mother’s Right to Know, New York City Hospitals Fail to Provide Legally Mandated
Maternity
Information,
(July
2005),
available
at
http://pubadvocate.nyc.gov/policy/documents/AMothersRightto Know.pdf.
133

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2803-j (2008).

134

N.Y. PUB. HEALTH § 2803-j (2008).

135

See, e.g,, WAGNER, supra note 4, at 24; see O.C.G.A. § 31-7-280(c)(13)(C) (2009)
(requiring that all hospitals operating in the state keep records of the C-section rate by number
and as a percentage of deliveries, and submit those records annually to the Department of
Community Health).
136
137

Donohoe, supra note 6 at 237-39; Wagner, supra note 4 at 205-206.

See generally Harris, supra note 86, at 139-40 (examining expanding fetal rights);
Amy Lotierzo, Comment, The Unborn Child, A Forgotten Interest: Reexamining Roe in Light
of Increased Recognition of Fetal Rights, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 279 (2006) (discussing expanding
fetal rights in federal legislation, family law, tort law, property law, and family law).
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Wade,138 “[i]n areas other than criminal abortion, the law [was] reluctant to endorse
any theory that life . . . begins before live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn
except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon
live birth.”139 Operating off this understanding of the law’s treatment of fetal rights,
the Roe Court reasoned that the unborn acquired legal rights only at birth.140 In
accordance with this rationale, Roe limited the state’s interest in protecting the rights
of the unborn.141
Since Roe, “there has been an increasing recognition and expansion of the rights
of unborn children in various areas of the law.”142 Probably the broadest protections
afforded to the fetus are given by state legislatures adopting laws declaring that a
fetus is a person from the time of fertilization and implantation.143 These laws give
courts the opportunity to protect the fetus or those who have a stake in its health
through tort, family, and property law.144 Other state protectionist laws aim to
protect the fetus from criminal harms inflicted by others.145 The federal government
has also taken an active role in protecting the fetus from criminal harms.146

138
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that unborn children are not legal persons
entitled to the protections of the Constitution).
139

Id. at 161.

140

Id.

141

However, as others have pointed out, when the Court ruled in Roe, the shift to laws
further recognizing the rights of the unborn had already begun. See Bradley Aron Cooper,
Essay, The Definition of “Person:” Applying the Casey Decision to Roe v. Wade, 19 Regent
U. L. Rev. 235, 241 (2006). In supporting this assertion, Mr. Cooper notes that the Roe Court
acknowledged that some states had already begun to pass wrongful death statutes permitting
parents to bring suit where prenatal injuries caused still births. Id.; see also Roe, 410 U.S. at
162. A fetus is viable when it is capable of living outside the womb. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
142

Lotierzo, supra note 137, at 279.

143

See generally 720 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 14:2(7) (2008)
(defining “person” as human beings from the moment of fertilization and implantation); MISS
CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (2006); MO. REV. STAT. §1.205 (2008) (declaring that the life of each
human begins at conception); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-809 (2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN
§1.07(a)(26) (2006). Others have suggested that there is no way to equalize the rights of the
fetus and the woman without undermining a woman’s liberty interests. See generally Lisa
McLennan Brown, Symposium: The Feminism and Legal Theory Project: Celebrating Twenty
Years of Feminist Pedagogy, Praxis and Prisms: Feminist Theory and the Erosion of Women’s
Reproductive Rights: The Implications of Fetal Personhood Laws and In Vitro Fertilization,
13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 87, 91 (2007).
144

See Lotierzo, supra note 137, at 279-81. These protections are not just limited to
mothers, as male interests in fetal health are also recognized. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E. 2d
522 (W. Va. 1995) (permitting bereaved father to bring a cause of action under West
Virginia’s wrongful death statute for the death of his wife and her nonviable fetus).
145

Currently, thirty-five states have passed legislation recognizing that, in some
circumstances, the unlawful killing of an unborn child is a homicide. See National Right to
Life Committee, State Unborn Victim Laws, available at http://www.nrlc.org
/Unborn_Victims/Statehomicidelaws092302.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). It merits
mentioning that New York’s statutes are conflicting. Under New York statutory law, the
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More unsettling than the above protections are those policies that aim to protect
the fetus from harms that have not yet occurred.147 Under the auspices of enforcing
the state’s interest in protecting fetal health, courts have forced mothers to undergo
C-sections148 and have used “incarceration, detention, orders of hospital confinement,
and threats thereof, to compel pregnant women to access prenatal care and to submit
to their physicians' directions regarding medical treatment for the benefit of fetal
health.”149 Judges have also used such threats to "encourage" the mother to bring her
fetus to term.150
i. Compelled Medical Treatment
The right to refuse medical treatment is not absolute,151 and where a mother
refuses to undergo medical treatment, some courts have performed a balancing test to
decide whether a compelling state interest exists to override the competent mother's
refusal of medical treatment.152 Where the judge has determined that the state’s
interests outweigh the mother’s right of bodily autonomy, a court will subvert
maternal rights to protect the fetus.153 Although only a few forced medication cases
have ever occurred, it is plausible that changes in how women are perceiving birth

killing of an "unborn child" after twenty-four weeks of pregnancy is homicide. N.Y. Pen. Law
§ 125.00 (McKinney 1998). But under a separate statutory provision, a "person" that is the
victim of a homicide is statutorily defined as a "human being who has been born and is alive."
N.Y. Pen. Law § 125.05 (McKinney 1998). See People v. Joseph, 130 Misc. 2d 377, 496
N.Y.S.2d 328 (County Court 1985); In re Gloria C., 124 Misc.2d 313, 476 N.Y.S.2d 991
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984); People v. Vercelletto, 514 N.Y.S.2d 177 (Co. Ct. 1987).
146

See Unborn Victims of Violence Act, 18 U.S.C.S. §1841 (LexisNexis 2008) (protecting
the unborn fetus by punishing those who cause criminal injury to a child in utero).
147

Cf. Cherry, supra note 113.

148

See In Re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987) (forcing terminally ill cancer patient to
undergo C-section); Jefferson, 274 S.E.2d at 457 (affirming lower court order compelling a
woman to submit to C-section and other procedures allegedly necessary to save the fetus’s
life); Pemberton, 66 F. Supp.2d at 1247 (discussed below).
149

Cherry, supra note 113, at 148.

150

Id.

151

Cruzan v, Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280- 82 (1990).

152

See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At The Intersection Of The
Ideology Of Motherhood, The Practice Of Defaulting to Science, And The Interventionist
Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205 1252-53 (1992) (discussing the balancing test used in
compelled medical treatment cases).
153
The likelihood that such a petition will be granted is unclear. Numerous commentators
have argued that such court orders are unacceptable. See generally Harris, supra note 86, at
161; Cohan, supra note 112. at 896 n.213 (highlighting multiple law review articles that
discuss the maternal fetal rights debate); but see Daniel R. Leavy, The Maternal-Fetal
Conflict: The Right of a Woman to Refuse A Cesarean Section Versus The State’s Interest In
Saving The Life of The Fetus, 108 W. VA. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (2005) (arguing that a state should
be able to require a woman to under to undergo a C-section based on a duty to rescue due to
the special relationship formed between the mother and fetus by the time of viability).
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(most dramatically represented by the home birth movement), will give rise to more
situations where the judiciary will be called upon to resolve delivery decisions.154
In Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l. Reg. Med. Ctr., Inc, Florida’s Second
Judicial Circuit granted permission to Tallahassee Memorial Medical Center to
forcibly perform a C-section on Laura Pemberton because attempting vaginal
delivery constituted too great a risk to fetal health, given her physical condition.155
The scar from Ms. Pemberton’s previous C-section posed such a threat to her unborn
child’s life that no doctor or midwife would attend a vaginal delivery.156 Yet, Ms.
Pemberton remained convinced that vaginal delivery was the safest way to deliver
her child.157 Ms. Pemberton ignored all medical advice and ordered medical supplies
so that she and her husband could deliver their child alone.158 After laboring for two
days, Ms. Pemberton checked into Tallahassee Memorial requesting IV fluids.159
While at Tallahassee Memorial, three separate physicians determined that a cesarean
was medically necessary.160 Rather than undergoing a C-section, Ms. Pemberton fled
Tallahassee Memorial.161 That decision resulted in police forcibly returning Ms.
Pemberton to Tallahassee Memorial, where doctors proceeded to forcibly execute a
C-section after determining that the state’s interest in delivering a healthy baby
superseded Ms. Pemberton’s interest in refusing a C-section.162
Ms. Pemberton’s case is often cited as an example of the government
overstepping its bounds and hospitals refusing to let birth proceed naturally.163 But
in light of the government’s propensity to protect the fetus from harm, it also
provides a warning sign to mothers participating in home births. Like Ms.
Pemberton, many mothers that decide to forego hospital births have done so based
on strong personal beliefs about childbirth.164 As the home birth movement and the
reaction against medicalized birth grow in popularity, mothers will continue place
greater faith in their body’s natural ability to deliver safely. As anti-intervention
convictions grow stronger, more circumstances may arise where doctor and patient

154

See infra part IV; Cf. Leavy, supra note 153.

155

Pemberton, 66 F. Supp.2d at 1256.

156

Ms. Pemberton’s scar “extended well beyond the traditional low vertical incision up
into the thickened myometrium.” Id. at 1249. Initially, a physician did support a vaginal birth,
but the physician withdrew his support when Ms. Pemberton was twenty-five weeks pregnant.
BLOCK, supra note 4, at 249. The court’s opinion differs from Block’s account in that it does
mention that a midwife was attending during the labor. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp.2d at 1249.
157

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 249.

158

Id.

159

Id.

160

Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1249. All tests, indicated that the fetus was healthy and
birth was progressing safely, albeit slowly. BLOCK, supra note 4, at 251.
161

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 250.

162

Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.

163

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 250.

164

See Cohen, supra note 21, at 855-57.
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strongly disagree about the appropriate delivery method. More disagreements could
lead to court compelled medical treatment.165
ii. Detention, Incarceration, and Child Abuse
Courts may also take a mother into custody to protect the fetus from potential
harm. Professor Cherry explains that some courts may use their parens patriae166
power to take mothers into custody and “compel state-sanctioned maternal behavior
deemed necessary for the health or life of fetuses.”167 Some courts have relied on
provisions in state child welfare laws to support taking custody of the fetus.168
Others have taken an aggressive role in fetal protection where there exists a high
potential that fetal harms will arise from poor maternal choices.169 This is especially
true where a woman’s criminal actions have put fetal health at risk.170 Implicit in
these policies is a belief that alcohol or drug dependent mothers are unfit to make
decisions about what is best for the life and well being of their fetuses.171
The judiciary’s distrust of maternal decision-making in some circumstances and
its willingness to enforce child abuse statutes against drug dependent mothers could
begin to affect mothers who simply possess anti-intervention convictions. At least
one trial court has determined that a mother’s refusal to consent to a C-section was a
“major consideration” when terminating a mother’s parental rights.172 In that case,
165

Because the government has taken a greater role in protecting the fetus, and decisions
may have to be made in an instant, it is possible that the courts will determine that compelled
medical treatment is acceptable. See infra Part IV.
166

The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its capacity as provider of protection to
those unable to care for themselves. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
167

Cherry, supra note 113, at 159.

168

See Wisconsin ex rel Angela M.W. v. Kruziki, 561 N.W. 2d. 729 (Wis. 1997).

169

Mothers have faced murder and child endangerment charges for using drugs while
pregnant. See State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (convicting mother of murder after it was
shown that mother’s use of cocaine caused fetal death); Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d
777 (1997), cert denied, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998) (charging mother with child endangerment
after child tested positive for cocaine after birth); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870
(Mich. Ct. App 1980) (allowing child to sue mother for taking drug during pregnancy that may
have caused the child’s teeth discoloration); Curlender v. Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr.
477, 488 (1980); See generally Cherry, supra note 113 (discussing the detention and
confinement of pregnant women for the sake of fetal health); Brown, supra note 143, at 91.
170

Courts in more than thirty states have heard attempts to prosecute women for using
drugs or alcohol during pregnancy. SHEENA MEREDITH, POLICING PREGNANCY, THE LAW AND
ETHICS OF OBSTETRIC CONFLICT 78 (Ashgate 2005) (citing to Cynthia Cooper, Ford
Foundation Report, Pregnant and Punished, available at http://www.fordfound.org/
publications).
171

Cherry, supra note 113, at 152-53.

172
See New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. V.M. and B.G., 408 N.J. Super 222,
249 (2009) (Carchman, J. Concurring). In affirming the trial court’s approval of the New
Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services plan for termination of parental rights, the per
curium opinion declined to decide the issue of whether refusal to consent to a C-section can be
considered an element of abuse and neglect because “substantial additional evidence of abuse
and neglect supported the ultimate findings.” Id. at 224.
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the mother’s combative behavior during labor (including thrashing, screaming and
refusing to consent to a C-section or fetal scalp stimulation) resulted in an emergency
competency evaluation.173 Following an initial conclusion that she had the capacity
for informed consent with regard to the C-section, the mother successfully delivered
vaginally without incident.174 Subsequent investigations into the mother’s mental
state and her actions during those investigations resulted in termination of her
parental rights based upon New Jersey’s child abuse and neglect statute.175 Court
decisions like this will affect maternal decision-making.176
D. Limits During Labor
Delivering a baby is dangerous. A relatively mundane delivery can transform
into an outright emergency in an instant.177 Add a team of nurses awaiting
instruction, labor pains, and general excitement to an already hectic environment and
it is easy to see why the physician needs to play an authoritative role in the delivery
room. Fairly or unfairly, this authority makes mothers vulnerable to coercion.178
Because a physician has economic, legal, and personal interests in how a child is
delivered, much of the criticism levied against the current maternity care system
surrounds how this authority affects delivery outcomes.179 The solutions offered
within this Note presume that such criticisms have merit.180
173

Id. at 227-28.

174

Id. at 228.

175

Id. at 224. Although the mother’s actions after delivery may justify the court’s
decision, her parental rights may not have been threatened had she consented to the C-section.
See, e.g. id.at 228-34.
176
By refusing to consent to a C-section or other procedures, mothers may be subject to
unnecessary mental health examinations, or their refusal could weigh against their favor in a
future parental rights dispute. Perhaps more pervasive than these hypothetical circumstances is
the chilling effect that court decisions like V.M. will have on maternal choice; as they could
result in maternal submission to unwanted medical treatment for fear of similar adverse
consequences. From an alternative perspective, decisions like V.M. also provide aggressive
advocates within the home birth movement with another opportunity to demonize mainstream
medical care. See infra Part IV.E. Such demonization could contribute to a hostile
relationship between patient and physician.
177

Cf. Heyman, supra note 50.

178

See generally BLOCK, supra note 4, at 261; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 130-32.

179
The following section is a summation of a major criticism levied against physicians. See
WAGNER, supra note 4; BLOCK, supra note 4, at 17, 42, 45-55; Hermer, supra note 16. The
author does not suggest that these criticisms are completely correct or applicable to all doctors;
however, considering the amount of attention the subject has received from the popular media
as well as academic sources, the author believes that presenting the criticism to the reader to
demonstrate the ways that a mother may have her choice limited is warranted.
180
At least some evidence suggests that mothers may be pressured into having C-sections.
See Law, supra note 6, at 354 (citing a 2006 “Listening to Mothers” survey finding that almost
10% of women surveyed reported feeling pressured to have a C-section); BLOCK, supra note
4, at 17 (noting that a 2005 survey reported that one in ten women reported being pressured to
induce).
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1. Pushed Births
More than ever before, mothers are having C-sections and receiving medical
assistance when delivering their children.181 Medical malpractice law undoubtedly
contributes to this environment of intervention. “Obstetricians and gynecologists
have historically been targets of lawsuits more often than other physicians. ... [They]
are more likely than any other kind of physician to lose a malpractice trial— and
they pay correspondingly high insurance premiums.”182 Physicians are well aware
of this and this knowledge may influence their chosen treatment methods.183
Performing C-sections provides an opportunity to protect against lawsuits.184 In
general, malpractice suits concerning C-sections focus on two types of negligence
allegations: failure to perform a necessary C-section and negligent performance of a
C-section.185 Choosing to perform a C-section allows a physician to avoid the
potential liabilities that may arise from a “failure to perform a necessary C-section”
suit186 and permits them to complete the procedure in non-emergency situation,
which lowers the likelihood that harm will occur.187 In many circumstances, Csections are just as safe,188 and can be performed in a much shorter time than vaginal
childbirth.189 C-sections, therefore, arguably allow a physician to maximize the
efficiency and profitability of his or her practice without compromising maternal or
fetal health.

181
The C-section rate reached an all time high in 2007. See supra note 70. The rate of
labor induction more than doubled from 1990 to 1998, jumping to nineteen and four-tenths
percent of all births in 1998. Linda Villarosa, Making an Appointment With the Stork, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2002 available at http://query.nytimes.com (archived). Currently fifteen
percent of deliveries in American are aided by induction methods. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, supra note 77.
182
James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un) Reasonable Care, 94 VA. L. REV. 1641,
1673 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
183
Gibson, supra note 182, at 1674 (citing to Russell Localio et al., Relationship Between
Malpractice Claims and Cesarean Delivery, 269 JAMA 366 (1993); Sheldon Brown III,
Lawsuit Activity, Defensive Medicine and Small Area Variation: The Case of Cesarean
Sections Revisited, 2 HEALTH ECON. POL’Y & L. 285 (2007)). Dr. Wagner suggests this
conclusion as well. See WAGNER, supra note 4, at 154. Professor Law notes that others have
suggested that physician fears surrounding malpractice liability may be exaggerated. Law,
supra note 6, at 370 (citing to Margaret Lent, The Medical and Legal Risks of Electronic Fetal
Monitoring, 51 STAN. L. REV. 897, 816-17).
184
Gibson, supra note 182, at 1674 (documenting that a “substantial majority” of
obstetricians respond to the legal exposure by increasing the number of cesarean deliveries
they perform).
185

Hilary E. Berkman, A Discussion of Medical Malpractice and Cesarean Section, 70
ORE. L. R. 629 (1991) (identifying and discussing both malpractice claims).
186

Id.

187

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 41.

188

See supra note 72.

189

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 38.
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But what could be interpreted as physicians opting to provide one of two “equally
reasonable alternatives,”190 others suggest is demonstrative of a more disturbing
trend.191 In addition to the factors Professor Sylvia A. Law identifies as contributing
to the high C-section rate, critics argue that doctors are allowing the desired outcome
of a quick, cost-effective, and liability free delivery, instead of medical necessity,
determine how laboring mothers will deliver their children.192 Too often, these
critics allege, doctors will use their disproportionate power to “push” their patients
into undergoing unnecessary procedures193 or taking unnecessary medication without
giving proper respect to the mother’s wishes or her body’s natural ability to safely
deliver a child.194
Reducing the risk of malpractice liability is not the only reason that critics
suggest a push may occur. Others propose that certain personal factors also
contribute to physicians ignoring the medical evidence and coercing mothers into
undergoing intrusive and unnecessary procedures.195 For example, less time is
required for a C-section, thereby freeing up more time for other activities, such as
sleeping (nighttime delivery) or increasing income by seeing other patients.196 Dr.

190

Law, supra note 6, at 362. This Note agrees with Professor Law that “the voices of
women should be given greater weight, particularly in circumstances such as those . . . where
professional opinion is in conflict and women bring different values to the birthing
experience.” Id.
191
Professor Law concisely summarizes four factors contributing to unnecessary and
unwanted C-sections: namely Electronic Fetal Monitoring, C-section for breech birth, failure
to progress, and vaginal birth after C-section. See id. at 354-62.
192

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 39-41.

193

Perhaps the most extreme example of this “push” can be seen in the instance of vaginal
birth after C-section (hereinafter “VBAC”). More than 9 out of 10 births after an initial Csection are also C-sections. Pamela Paul, The Trouble With Repeat Cesareans, TIME, Feb. 19,
2009, available at http://www.time.com/printout/0,8816,1880665,00.html (last visited Aug.
27, 2009). Many of these C-sections may not be the result of maternal choice, but are instead
a consequence of physicians and hospitals refusing to attend VBAC deliveries. Id.; Law,
supra note 6, at 357-60, 368 (explaining that the VBAC ban in many hospitals stems from a
“misunderstanding of the law”). Others have documented that to protect against possible
liability from attending such deliveries, doctors may be providing skewed information to
mothers about the safety of VBACs. See Paul, supra note 193. Physicians may be “pushing”
mothers towards intervention for other reasons as well. WAGNER, supra note 4, at 95-96. For
example, a baby may be deemed “too big” or may remain in the uterus too long. Id.
194
WAGNER, supra note 4, at 39. Whatever the cause, some critics point to federal studies
analyzing birth certificates to give merit to their claim. Id. (citing to Ctrs. For Disease Control
& Prevention, Nat’l Vital Stats. Reports, Births: Method of Delivery, available at
www.cdc.goc/nchs/birth (last visited Dec. 4, 2008). The certificates show that the percentage
of births and emergency C-sections that happen Monday through Friday between nine and five
is rapidly increasing relative to weekends and nighttime hours. Id. Wagner suggests that this
evidence indicates that physicians are influencing the time of delivery so they will not be
inconvenienced by having to work beyond typical working hours. Id. at 29, 27.
195

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 40-41.

196

Id. at 38-41.
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Marsden Wagner197 argues that other contributing factors include: a desire to control
the most unpredictable portion of professional life, a belief in the trustworthiness of
machines over a woman’s understanding of her own body, and a need to look for
problems when none exist.198 Lastly, Dr. Wagner asserts that doctors may perform
procedures as a means to solidify their importance within a medical community that
is beginning to recognize the utility of delivering with a midwife.199
Regardless of the validity of these criticisms, they will not be disappearing in the
near future. The factors indicating that a C-section is necessary are not based on
objective criteria;200 instead, physicians must rely on their own judgment when
determining whether a C-section is warranted.201 So long as the economic, legal, and
personal motivations continue to exist, so too will the criticisms about physician
motivations for intervening with natural labor. As these criticisms intensify in the
mainstream media,202 and the reaction against such intervention tactics becomes
stronger,203 the number of physician-patient conflicts may grow more frequent, and
could produce undesirable results.
2. Informed Consent
Physicians may be making improper promises or inadequate disclosures
regarding the dangers of C-sections and inductions.204 In a recent study, less than
one-third of the women surveyed after delivery were familiar with the risks posed by
C-sections.205 That same study showed that less than half the women surveyed could
correctly identify the risks of induction.206 The doctrine of informed consent explains
that:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has the right to
determine what shall be done with [their] own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without [their] patient's consent commits an assault,
for which he is liable in damages . . . This is true except in cases of

197
Dr. Wagner is a former director of Women’s and Children’s Health at the World Health
Organization. Id. at viii-ix.
198

Id. at 38-41.

199

Id. at 39.

200

MEREDITH, supra note 169, at 71 Cf. Paul, supra note 193.

201

MEREDITH, supra note 169, at 71; Cf. Paul, supra note 193.

202

See infra part IV.C.5.

203

Cf. BLOCK, supra note 4 at 262 (documenting “informed dissent” and teaching women
the concept of saying “no” to interventions).
204
Cf. MEREDITH, supra note 169, at 71; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 45 (asserting that “the
fact that women are choosing C-sections strongly suggests they are not being told the truth
about all the risks to themselves and to their babies”); Paul, supra note 193.
205

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 153-54.

206

Id. at 154.
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emergency where the patient is unconscious and where it is necessary to
operate before consent can be obtained.207
If women cannot identify the risks associated with a procedure, their consent may
not be truly informed.208
What exactly a physician must disclose varies significantly from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction.209 Roughly half of the jurisdictions in America require a physician to
provide information that a "reasonable medical practitioner" would provide in the
same or similar circumstances.210 The remaining U.S. jurisdictions have abandoned
this standard in favor of a "reasonable patient" standard,211 which requires the
physician, on the basis of his medical training and experience, to objectively disclose
what a reasonable patient expectably would deem material in making her decision.212
In obtaining a mother’s informed consent, a physician may be able to comply with
informed consent standards while papering over risks that may concern reasonable
mothers.213
Even if an individual physician does not believe that C-sections or inductions
have a great potential for harm, the risks must still be clearly conveyed to mothers
when making decisions. Because "[a] compelled surgical intrusion into an
individual's body . . . implicates expectations of privacy and security" of great
magnitude,”214 it is paramount that a physician comply with the requirements of
informed consent before performing a C-section. Informing a mother of these risks
may change her feelings towards undergoing a C-section or induction.215
There are also disagreements about the relative benefits and dangers posed by
induced labor. Physicians differ in their opinions regarding how dangerous Oxytocin
is and exactly how cautious a doctor should be before administering it.216 A
207

Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30 (N.Y. 1914).

208

Only seventeen percent of women who received an episiotomy reported having a
choice in the matter. BLOCK, supra note 4, at 154. An episiotomy is a surgical incision used to
enlarge the vaginal opening to help deliver the baby. American Pregnancy Association,
Episiotomy, available at http://www.americanpregnancy. org/labornbirth/episiotomy.html (last
accessed Jan. 30 2009).
209

Ketler, supra note 3, at 1045 (citing to Richard A. Heinemann, Note, Pushing to the
Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1997
WIS. L. REV. 1079, 1082(1997)).
210

Id.

211

Id.

212

See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D. C. Cir. 1972).

213

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 165, 253, 257.

214

Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 176 (2005) (citing to Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
124 (1992)).
215
Dr. Wagner suggests that mothers who elect to have a C-section without a medical
reason do not have an understanding of the risks inherent in the procedure. See WAGNER,
supra note 4, at 45. Professor Law notes that the medical profession has done a commendable
job of attempting to reduce the appearance of coercion by requiring that doctors only discuss
the possibility of elective C-sections after mother raises the issue. Law, supra note 6, at 367.
216

1 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1.
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fundamental question deals with how rapidly the starting dose should be increased
when the patient fails to respond.217 Oxytocin has been administered under
circumstances that later proved to be inappropriate, resulting in asphyxiation of the
fetus, severe neurological damage to the baby, mental retardation, and a general lack
of motor function and coordination.218 Furthermore, inducing birth does not always
work219 and a C-section may still be required.220
Induction also presents a unique problem that physicians may not make known to
their patients. This threat is known as the cascade of intervention.221 Pitocin
produces stronger and more frequent contractions.222 Once the induction process
begins, these stronger and more frequent contractions cause pain in the increasingly
sensitive uterus.223 Because the contractions are more painful, more anesthetics are
required.224 As more anesthetics are required, additional medications are required to
combat the side effects of those medications.225 A mother may not appreciate the
pain that comes along with induced labor. If she is made aware of the possibility that
additional medications may be needed, she may not exercise this option.
Lastly, it has also been suggested that some courts have wrongfully assumed that
the “elevated level of anxiety that laboring patients experience renders unnecessary
and even harmful the usual requirements of informed consent, because in their state
of anxiety, laboring patients are unable to make the rational choices that are a key
reason for obtaining informed consent in the first place.”226 Dr. Suzanne K. Ketler
further identified that some courts have subscribed to the idea that labor and birth are
a process that happen without choice or decision, and consequently informed consent
is not required.227
However, informed consent law in the labor and delivery sphere continues to
evolve. As Dr. Ketler highlighted, Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wisconsin228
217

1 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1 (citing to GABBE, supra note 78; J. Seitchik et al.,
Amniotomy and Oxytocin Treatment of Functional Dystocia and Route of Delivery, 155 AM.
J. OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 585, 592 (1986)).
218
1 Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1 (citing Low v. United States, 795 F.3d 466 (5th Cir.
1996)); Moore v. Grandview Hospital, 495 N.E.2d 934 (Ohio 1986)).
219

If a mother’s water breaks but her cervix fails to dilate despite receiving the drugs
containing prostaglandins, she probably will need a c-section due to the risk of infection. 1
Am. Jur. 3d Proof of Facts 1.
220

WAGNER, supra note 4, 78-79.

221

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 139.

222

Id.

223

Id. Each medication carries with it its own side effect and own risks. Id.

224

Hermer, supra note 16, at 348.

225

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 139-40.

226

Ketler, supra note 3, at 1045.

227

Id. at 1040-44.

228

588 N.W.2d 26 (Wis. 1999) (finding a breach of statutory duty to conduct second
informed consent discussion with patient who revoked consent to vaginal delivery and
requested C-section).
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changed the process and timing of informed consent to a more patient centered
approach.229 Rather than end with a physician’s specific disclosure, Dr. Ketler notes
that Schreiber essentially requires physicians to conduct ongoing informed consent
discussions with laboring patients whenever there is a “substantial change in
circumstance, either medical or legal.”230 This approach is not without its
ambiguities or shortcomings,231 but in light of the criticisms levied against the
medical profession,232 applying this standard could curb criticisms of physician
coercion and potentially foster a more cooperative doctor-patient relationship.233
E. Aggressive Advocates
Arguments for home births and midwifery can be quite persuasive.234 In addition
to voicing the benefits of vaginal birth with a midwife, advocates are quick to
criticize physicians, hospitals, and the practices used within.235 Home birth
proponents often draw a stark contrast between the soothing environment that a
mother can create when she decides to give birth at home and the sterile, sometimes
harsh, hospital environment.236 In espousing an aggressive, anti-physician position,
these advocates may be guiding some mothers towards making unsafe birth choices.
Midwife and home birth advocacy resources often cite to personal stories of
women who, having opted for hospital births, lost control of the entire process before
undergoing what they believed were unnecessary C-sections or other needless
procedures.237 These advocates allege that home birth promises a more rewarding

229

Ketler, supra note 3, at 1031.

230

Id. at 1053.

231

Id. at 1054-56. Dr. Ketler notes that this process “encroaches . . . on the physicians’
decision making ability and fails to provide physicians with reasonable guidelines for making
medically necessary decisions . . . .” Id. at 1032. Moreover, Dr. Ketler criticizes the process as
resulting in treatment on demand. Id. at 1052. Dr. Ketler proposes that statutory amendments
be enacted to clarify when such additional discussions are needed. Id. at 1055. The author
agrees with this recommendation and believes that such changes ought to be clearly delineated
and then taught to mothers through the patient education process suggested by this Note. See
infra part V.
232

See Part III.D (outlining physician coercion).

233

Although Dr. Ketler cautions that adopting this standard would contribute to the
physician’s decreasing professional autonomy, a more patient centered approach could
facilitate better communication and consequently result in more effective care.
234

See generally WAGNER, supra note 4; BLOCK, supra note 4. There is even a national
campaign aggressively advocating for uniform regulation and licensure for Direct-Entry
Midwives. See The Big Push For Midwives, www.thebigpushformidwives.org (last visited
Dec. 2, 2008).
235

Cf. WAGNER, supra note 4, at 20-27 (criticizing the “tribal” culture of the hospital
setting and suggesting that some doctors have a desire to harm women).
236

Id.

237

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 45-70.

2010]

PUSHING BACK: PROTECTING MATERNAL AUTONOMY

73

delivery experience.238 There are many health benefits to delivering vaginally.239 In
addition to explaining those benefits, some advocates go further, encouraging home
births because natural childbirth may increase the likelihood that a woman will
receive a “love cocktail” of chemicals released by the body during labor.240 Such a
chemical rush, they posit, forges a stronger, deeper bond between mother and
child.241
Amidst these promises of a more fulfilling delivery and encouragement for
mothers to trust their bodies’ natural abilities to correct minor pregnancy problems,
most midwifery proponents openly admit that the option is not safe for every
mother.242 However, strong advocacy for the many positives of “natural” delivery
may dilute warnings regarding the safety risks involved in childbirth and could
potentially lull mothers or midwives into a false sense of confidence regarding the
likelihood that a safe delivery will ensue.243
These critics, justified or not, also lobby harsh criticisms about the utility,
motives, and qualifications of the mainstream medical community.244 They paint
hospitals as sterile, cold, environments, run by a “tribe” of inhuman physicians who
are brainwashed into believing that patient choice is subordinate to convenience and
financial well-being.245 Such characterizations are unfair and can foster a combative
238

Some share stories of having orgasms while giving birth, and claim that other mothers
can have similar experiences (not necessarily an actual orgasm, but a similar happy conclusion
to labor). See Juju Chang and Gail Deutsch, Labor Orgasms Called ‘Best-Kept Secret,’ ABC
NEWS, Dec. 9, 2008, available at http://i.abcnews.com/Health/Story?id=6120045&page=2
(last visited Aug. 26, 2009),
239

See Law, supra note 6, at 350.

240

See THE BUSINESS OF BEING BORN, supra note 34.

241

Id.

242

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 95, 264; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 35, 195; Hermer, supra
note 4, at 344.
243
At least some parents that are selecting home births underestimate the potential risk
involved. Wolfson, supra note 87. There are numerous reported examples of women in the
medically high-risk category who have opted for home birth. Id. A mother’s strong desire to
deliver outside the hospital, coupled with a trust in the body’s capability to deliver safely,
could result in high-risk mothers delivering outside the hospital. When that confidence is
supported by a midwife, who may attend labors that others consider “too risky” due to an error
in judgment regarding the “screen-out” process or the consequences of the economic pressures
inherent in maintaining a viable midwifery practice (high malpractice premiums, low-usage,
etc.), the result could be that dangerous deliveries are attempted outside the safety of the
hospital setting. Cf. Dunleavy, supra note 124 (highlighting the economic difficulties of
maintaining a viable midwife practice). Admittedly, such a choice is each mother’s to make,
but when the decision is influenced by a demonization of mainstream medical practices, the
perception that a hospital birth is robbing the mother of one of life’s most fulfilling
experiences, and that such a choice could result in a weaker connection between mother and
child, mothers may be improperly pushed towards taking an unnecessary risk.
244
See Craig J. Thompson, Consumer Risk Perceptions in a Community of Reflexive
Doubt, 32 J. CONSUMER RESEARCH 235, 236-48.
245

WAGNER, supra note 4, 13-36. Dr. Wagner and others openly admit that such
generalizations do not apply to all physicians. See id. at 42; BLOCK, supra note 4, at 264.
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relationship between doctor and patient.246 As these criticisms become well known
through the mainstream media247 there may be an increase in patient refusal to
consent to physician-recommended procedures.248
The alternative birth movement is not alone in using the media to warn against
the dangers presented by other birth choices. The medical community is frequently
criticized for everything from ignoring scientific facts regarding the safety of
midwifery & home births,249 to employing scare tactics to control doctors and
hospitals.250 The medical lobby’s media use not only affects individual mother’s
delivery decisions, but also plays a major role in influencing the legality of
midwifery.251
Taken together, the aggressive advocates on both sides of the debate have created
an environment where determining what constitutes a safe delivery choice is a
challenging task. The home birth movement plays upon strong emotional desires for
a satisfying delivery outside the hospital, a sense of empowerment, and a distrust of
physicians to create strong willed mothers who may not easily submit to necessary
medical intervention. On the other side of the spectrum, mothers who afford too
much weight to the medical lobby’s distrust of out of hospital births are at risk for
experiencing needless medical interventions because they choose to deliver in a
hospital, rather than another available locale.252

246
When emergencies require obstetrical intervention, such a relationship can jeopardize
maternal or fetal health.
247

See supra note 34.

248

Cf. BLOCK, supra note 4, at 262 (documenting the “informed dissent” process, teaching
women to say no to electronic fetal monitoring, induced labor, etc.). Ultimately, if such
knowledge grows more common, the result could be more court ordered medication or
termination of parental rights. Cf. Cohen, supra note 21, at 861 (explaining the idea that there
has begun to be a turn on the nation’s long, unquestioning deference to doctors, and noting
that some have begun to realize that decisions that women have turned over to doctors must be
reclaimed because they directly affect personal dignity and definitions of self).
249

See WAGNER, supra note 4, at 45, 150-51.

250

Id. at 27, 150.

251

Id. at 35,118-19,124 (documenting mainstream medical associations’ actions at
legislative hearings considering legalizing Direct-Entry Midwifery); Cohen, supra note 21, at
854 (documenting that a standard explanation for the stalemate on midwifery reform is the
medical lobby’s attempt to “preserve its economic share of the birthing business by preventing
midwifery regulation and utilizing its traditional influence over courts.”).
252
These complications demonstrate the need for an educational source that will offer
non-biased information to expecting mothers. This Note is not alone in suggesting that
increased maternal education is necessary to improve maternity care in America. See
WAGNER, supra note 4, at 207-09; Donohoe, supra note 6, at 230 (“only through information
and education will women be able to create market forces that will slow the cesarean
epidemic”). Part V will propose that maternal education be provided by a disinterested
collection of midwives & physicians who can evaluate each mother’s unique risks and explain
the benefits of each delivery option.
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F. Insurers Limiting Choice
For some women, a harsh reality of childbirth is that their insurance coverage
may limit the options they have in delivering their child. “A woman who selects a
mode of delivery based on what she is told her insurance will reimburse is not
exercising choice based on the best interests of her child and self.”253 Mothers who
wish to have their delivery attended by a midwife may have trouble obtaining
coverage for the procedure. Although the Federal Government has rewritten its
insurance plans to allow midwives to be paid,254 some insurance companies do not
cover home births,255 and not all state Medicaid programs reimburse Direct-Entry
Midwives.256 Additionally, recent cost-cutting efforts have precluded some mothers
who receive Medicaid from delivering in freestanding alternative birth centers.257 On
the caregiver side, high malpractice insurance premiums cause physicians and
hospitals to refuse to admit mothers with previous C-sections to attempt vaginal
deliveries,258 discourage physicians from providing legally required backup services

253

Law, supra note 6, at 376.

254

See 10 U.S.C. § 1079 (a)(13) (Amended in 1990, see P.L. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1581)
(including midwifery as a covered medical care for the armed forces) and 42 U.S.C.A. §1396d
(a)(17) (2009) (Amended to include “midwife” July 18, 1984, see P.L. 98-369, 98 stat. 1110 )
(covering midwifery under Medicare/Medicaid); see also Harlow, supra note 21.
255
Homebirth-USA, Cost and Insurance Coverage, www.homebirth-usa.org/choosing/
insurance.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2008).
256

The American Association of Birth Centers reports that “about 9 or 10 state Medicaid
plans pay Direct-Entry Midwives.” See American Association of Birth Centers, Medicaid and
Birth Centers: Background Information, available at http://www.birthcenters.org/legislativealerts/index.php?id=17 (last visited Aug. 26, 2009); See also Midwifery Alliance of North
America, Direct Entry Midwifery State-by-State Legal Status, supra note 11 (reflecting that 11
states have Medicaid reimbursement).
257

See American Association of Birth Centers, Judge Rules Against Birth Centers,
available at http://www.birthcenters.org/news/breaking-news/?id=83. (last visited Aug. 25,
2009) (documenting that the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services is beginning to
disallow federal matching funds to states that pay birth center facility fees). The American
Association of Birth Centers reports that as many as 50-95% of some birth center’s patients
are Medicaid enrollees. Id.
258

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 29, 178 (documenting that, in some states, malpractice
insurance companies will no longer cover claims resulting from VBAC); Law, supra note 6 at
356-59, 368-70 (discussing the factors that gave rise to the VBAC ban in many hospitals &
noting that hospital and physician perceptions about risk and malpractice liability reflect a
“misunderstanding of the law”). See generally Paul, supra note 193 (documenting that a 2006
survey reporting that 26% of physicians had stopped VBAC deliveries because insurance was
unaffordable or unavailable). Evidence suggests that some mothers are interested in
attempting VBAC in areas where it is commonly denied. Id. (citing to a New York survey
documenting that 57% of mothers would be interested in attempting vaginal delivery); Law,
supra note 6, at 357 (asserting that “when VBAC is commonly denied, many women who
would prefer vaginal birth are denied that choice”); BLOCK, supra note 4 at 261(documenting
the plight of women who, as a result of VBAC bans, have their delivery options limited to Csection at a hospital or homebirth with a midwife).
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to freestanding alternative birth centers, and make it difficult for alternative birth
centers and Direct-Entry Midwives to practice. 259
IV. “NEW” OPTIONS PROVIDE A GREATER CHANCE FOR LIMITATION
The government, insurance companies, and health care providers may limit a
woman’s delivery options.260 In considering these limits alongside the government’s
growing propensity to protect the fetus, and a distrust of different birth methods, it
appears that maternal independence during labor will begin to erode. The following
portion will show how elective C-sections, elective induction, and home births
further contribute to a decline in maternal autonomy.
A. Home Births
As home births grow in popularity, it is possible that more situations will arise
where physicians call upon courts to resolve delivery room conflicts. Pemberton261
was examined above in detail because it is illustrative of the type of conflict that may
arise as home births increase in popularity. Like Ms. Pemberton, many mothers that
opt for home births have done so because they trust their natural ability to safely
deliver children and prefer to deliver outside of a hospital.262 These strong beliefs,
coupled with a distrust of physicians arguably created by aggressive home birth
advocates, could increase the number of women who do not wish to undergo any
medical intervention during labor. When these women call upon the hospital
because delivery stagnates or an emergency arises, they may be more averse to
undergoing the physician’s recommended treatment. As more situations like this
arise, it is possible that more of those rare circumstances will develop where doctors
solicit the courts to compel medical treatment. In light of the government’s growing
propensity to protect the fetus,263 the commonly misunderstood maternal desire for
natural delivery,264 and other commentators suggesting that compelled medical
treatment is justifiable,265 more courts may conclude that compelled medical
treatment is acceptable.266
259

WAGNER, supra note 4 at 228-29; see also supra notes 124-25.

260

See supra Part III.

261

Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1247.

262

See supra Part II.A.2.

263

See supra Part III.C.

264

Cohen, supra note 21, at 858.

265

See Leavy, supra note 153, at 98-99 (2005) (arguing that a state should be able to
require a woman to under to undergo a C-section “due to the special relationship formed
between the mother and the fetus by the time of viability”).
266

Janet Gallagher has identified several commonalities in forced medications cases:
medications are often initiated shortly before birth or during labor, the mothers rarely testify
directly, and misinformation is common. See Cohen, supra note 21, at 866 n.75 (citing to Janet
Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong With Fetal Rights, 10 HARV.
WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 48-54 (1987)). Many of these commonalities would be present in situations
where a mother who chooses to deliver at home seeks minor medical assistance while in the
throes of labor.
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The home birth movement will also affect mothers choosing to deliver in the
hospital. The distrust of physicians and the desire to avoid medical intervention
cultivated by the home birth movement could cause women to distrust a physician’s
determination that medical intervention is necessary. Such beliefs, when coupled
with “informed dissent” programs, will lead to combative behavior in the delivery
room that could have undesirable consequences.267
Wherever the option is legal, regardless of safety, the choice to have a home birth
attended by a midwife is a choice every mother can make.268 So long as the option
remains available, interested parties’ concerns that home births needlessly risk fetal
health269 will always be present. Accordingly, steps should be taken to protect a
mother’s choice to deliver where she sees fit, without fear of judicial intervention or
the adverse consequences of her decision. This Note proposes such steps in Part V.
B. C-Sections & Induced Labor
Elective C-sections and scheduled inductions will adversely affect the
independence of mothers hoping to avoid medical intervention.270 It has been
asserted that patient-choice C-sections lower or entirely remove the threshold for
when a C-section becomes medically necessary.271 Because of this lower threshold,
doctors may begin to determine that the criteria indicating that intervention is
appropriate exist sooner in the delivery process, thereby making mothers more likely
to experience a C-section or induction.272 Also, it is possible that a doctor’s views
about the acceptability of such procedures will be altered by the increasing number
of mothers requesting these procedures.273 The effects of this lower threshold could
be further exacerbated by the economic, legal, and personal benefits that physicians
receive when they opt to perform a C-section.274
267
This could result in termination of parental rights. See supra notes 172-176 and
accompanying text. Even if a mother does not aggressively resist certain treatment methods,
the chilling effect from previous court decisions may cause her to consent to procedures she
does not desire out of fear that combative behavior may result in undesirable consequences.
See supra note 176.
268

See, e.g., supra Part III (explaining that a mother’s right to choose her delivery option is
a fundamental right protected by the Constitution).
269
See supra Part II. Fetal injuries can occur in the home birth setting because it places
distance between mothers, skilled obstetricians, and valuable hospital equipment. Also
because there is no absolute method that can readily predict if or when a seemingly low-risk
pregnancy will turn into a high-risk one, determining that a mother is “low-risk” does not
guarantee that the mother will not need skilled medical assistance. Rausch, supra note 11, at
229.
270
Professor Law shares this concern. See Law, supra note 6, at 380 (suggesting that
elective C-sections may lead to diminished maternal choice. “It would be tragic if respect for
those choices led to an increase in the number of women pressured to have C-sections.”)
271

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 125 (quoting Howard Minkoff, Chair of Obstetrics and
Gynecology at Maimonidies Medical Center, Brooklyn, NY).
272

See Law, supra note 6, at 380

273

Id.

274

See supra Part III.D.
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V. RESOLUTION
No delivery method can guarantee a safe and healthy baby. In most births, these
“new” delivery options are safe choices that a mother can justifiably exercise.275
However, economic, legal, ideological, personal, and professional interests influence
a mother’s choice. As more women deliver using “new” options, it seems possible
that these interests will unfairly influence delivery decisions.
Numerous scholars have concluded that the mother is the best person to decide
how to deliver her child,276 and legal and medical standards are often in accord with
this position. But making the appropriate decision in light of numerous influences
and limitations can be challenging. A culture of physician distrust and uncertainty
about the safety of home births leaves some mothers without desirable options. For
some, the choice boils down to delivering in the hospital and risking unnecessary
intervention or injury, or delivering outside the hospital277 and risking injury because
skilled physicians and instruments are not readily available. Consequently, some
mothers are forced into choices that could result in physical and emotional injuries.278
And while the circumstances underlying these problems cannot be totally eliminated,
the state can take several steps to ensure that delivery decisions are well-informed,
made free from coercion, and without fear of negative repercussions.
A. Empowering the Mother as A Decision Maker
1. Increase the Information Available
The first way to protect mothers against the adverse effects of these “new”
delivery options is to increase the information made available to mothers.279 As
discussed above, only two states currently require that hospitals disclose their Csection and induction rates.280 In the past, concerted efforts to enact similar
legislation in other states have been stymied by powerful medical lobbies.281
Margaret Donohoe has suggested that information be physician specific, as a means
to curb unnecessary C-sections.282 Ms. Donohoe posits that making this information
available would help create market forces that could influence hospitals away from
C-section overuse and help women understand that C-sections are not always
necessary or appropriate.283 In furthering Ms. Donohoe’s suggestion, caregiver275

Law, supra note 6, at 346.

276
See generally Cohen, supra note 21, at 854 (arguing that, given the mother’s strong
privacy interests and parental rights to the developing child, the mother-to-be is the best
childbirth decision maker); Harris, supra note 86; Law supra note 6, at 362; WAGNER, supra
note 4, at 205-07.
277

BLOCK, supra note 4, at 261.

278

Injuries could occur in either the delivery or the home birth setting.

279

Donohoe, supra note 6, at 237; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 205-09.

280

See supra note 132.

281

Donohoe, supra note 6, at 238; WAGNER, supra note 4, at 11.

282

Donohoe, supra note 6, at 238-39.

283

Id. at 237.
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specific information should also be made available for Certified Professional and
Direct Entry Midwives.284 Having this information available on a midwife-specific
level would result in a better public understanding of the safety of out-of-hospital
midwife delivery, both for individuals considering delivery with a midwife and for
legislators looking for evidence regarding midwife safety. A better understanding of
midwife safety could result in fewer women being subject to unnecessary in-hospital
procedures. At the same time, making safety information available to the public
might deter midwives from attending risky deliveries that should take place in the
hospital.
Additional beneficial information could also become available by documenting
the number of “pushed births” at a given hospital. In 2005, Florida approved a
constitutional amendment giving patients access to records related to “adverse
medical incidents.”285 This amendment “represents one of the most sweeping
changes in law and public policy ever adopted in [Florida].”286 Amendment 7’s
purpose is to “create a constitutional right for a patient or a potential patient to know
and have access to records of a health care facility’s or provider’s adverse medical
incidents, including medical malpractice and other acts which have caused or have
the potential to cause injury or death.”287 A Florida court has defined “adverse
medical incidents” to mean “medical negligence, intentional misconduct and any
other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility that caused or could have caused
injury or death to a patient . . . .”288 It could be argued that compelling mothers to
undergo unnecessary procedures constitutes an adverse medical incident worthy of
documentation.289 By attempting to document the number of “pushed births,”
mothers angered with the way their delivery was managed would have a formal
avenue to voice their discontent, the public would have a way to investigate the
coercive nature of physicians, and physicians would be further dissuaded from
coercing mothers into undergoing unnecessary interventions.
2. Encouraging Disinterested Involvement
It is well settled that the government “has an interest in protecting the integrity
and ethics of the medical profession.”290 If the criticisms about physicians pushing
patients into invasive procedures or misleading mothers about their choices are

284

Hospital transfer rates, documentation of adverse medical outcomes, etc.

285

FL. CONST. art. X § 25.

286

J.B. Harris, Riding the Red Rocket: Amendment 7 and the End to Discovery Immunity
of Adverse Medical Incidents in the State of Florida, 80 FLA. BAR. J. 20 (2009).
287
Id. at ¶ 6 (citing to Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re: Patient’s Right to
Know About Adverse Medical Incidents, 880 So.2d 617, 619 (Fla. 2004)).
288

Id. at ¶ 10 (citing to Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 932 So. 2d 344, 350
(Fla. 5th Dist. Cr. App 2006)).
289
290

Accusations would first have to be reviewed for merit.

Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997); see also Barsky v. Board of
Regents of Univ. of N. Y., 347 U.S. 442, 451, (1954) (indicating that the State has a
"legitimate concern for maintaining high standards of professional conduct in the practice of
medicine”).
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valid,291 then some health care providers have brought the medical profession’s
integrity into question.292 To restore and protect this integrity, a state-supported,
disinterested maternal education program should be developed to encourage
disinterested physicians and midwives to cooperatively educate individual mothers
about the particular risks and benefits of their available delivery options and rights.
By requiring mothers early in pregnancy to consult with a state supported physicianmidwife panel that is not ultimately responsible for her care, the state could negate
the effects of aggressive birth advocates, eliminate concerns that physicians are
providing mothers with inadequate or improper information, and expose mothers
who had never considered delivery with a midwife an opportunity to interact with a
caregiver who applies a different philosophical approach to childbirth. Additionally,
more education may result in greater maternal independence in the delivery room,
because mothers may be able to communicate better with their physicians, and
physicians may have a greater respect for the mother’s delivery choice. Likewise,
home births will be safer because mothers will better appreciate the risks of
delivering outside the hospital, and will have more knowledge to draw upon that will
enable them to recognize and appreciate signs of trouble.293
B. Incentivize More Appealing Birth Conditions
A second way to protect mothers against the adverse effects of these “new”
delivery options is to offer economic incentives to make all labor options more
appealing. Freestanding alternative birth centers offer some mothers the freedom
they desire,294 but are not available everywhere.295 Where they are, high malpractice
premiums and changes to Medicaid are making it difficult for poorer mothers to
exercise the option.296 Currently, bills to amend Title XIX of the Social Security Act
to require coverage for freestanding alternative birth centers under the Medicaid
program are before both the United States Senate and House of Representatives.297
Passing this legislation would make freestanding alternative birth centers more
accessible to mothers with strong anti-intervention beliefs, but who cannot afford the
option without governmental aid. Furthermore, additional economic incentives
should be directed towards subsidizing the high malpractice premiums that

291

See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.

292

The medical community has made commendable strides to ensure that coercion does
not occur. See Law, supra note 6, at 367. Nevertheless, criticisms of physician coercion
persist. Cf. Paul, supra note 193. By having disinterested, qualified physicians & midwives
cooperatively educate mothers, criticisms regarding coercion would be greatly reduced.
293

The midwife approach requires the mother to take more responsibility for her own care
and education. Hermer, supra note 16. This Note does not contend that mothers are currently
uneducated, but instead suggests that hands on education with a trained obstetrician and
midwife during pregnancy will only further benefit the mother.
294

WAGNER, supra note 4, at 133, 137.
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See, e.g., BLOCK, supra note 4, at 106, 267.

296

See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
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Medicaid Birth Center Reimbursement Act, H.R. 2358, 111th Cong. (2009); Medicaid
Birth Center Reimbursement Act, S. 1423, 111th Cong. (2009).
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physicians must pay when they allow mothers to attempt to deliver vaginally after a
C-section or when they provide backup services to a freestanding alternative birth
center.298
C. Rethinking Informed Consent
A final way to protect mothers against the potential adverse effects of these
“new” birth options involves adopting a reshaped perception of informed consent in
the childbirth arena. Adopting the conception of informed consent articulated in
Schreiber299 will foster a more cooperative physician-patient relationship. Such a
continual, dialogue-driven informed consent process is consistent with the overall
progression towards greater maternal autonomy throughout pregnancy,300 and
Professor Law’s conclusion that women’s voices be given greater weight in birthing
decisions.301 This approach, when coupled with the education proposed within this
Note,302 can help eliminate coercive physician treatment, facilitate maternal trust in
physician decision-making, and aid in restoring the integrity of the medical
profession.
VI. CONCLUSION
As mothers are given more freedom to make their delivery choices, problems with
the current maternity care system and the legal protections afforded fetus have the
potential to diminish maternal independence. At one end of the spectrum, the home
birth movement and reactions against “medicalized” birth have the potential to create
physician distrust and a greater resistance to medical treatment. This resistance,
when coupled with an expansive view of fetal rights may result in compelled medical
treatment, injury, or the loss of parental rights. At the other end of the spectrum,
elective C-sections and inductions will diminish the likelihood that mothers who
wish to avoid medical intervention will be able to do so.303 Somewhere in between,
the fears surrounding birth are precluding mothers from exercising viable options
from the living room to the delivery room. A three-part solution has been proposed
to alleviate these problems. Taken together, these three prongs will empower
women to make better-informed birth decisions, hold physicians and midwives more
accountable, and create a more cooperative relationship between physician and
patient.

298

See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.

299

Schreiber, 588 N.W.2d at 26.
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See Ketler, supra, note 3.
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Law, supra note 6, at 362

302

The state can teach patients precisely what situations trigger the legal or medical
change in circumstances that necessitate further informed consent when it educates mothers
through the solution proposed herein.
303

This Note agrees with Professor Law in reaching this conclusion.

